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The Shelley-Byron Circle and the Idea of Europe 
 
Introduction 
 
This book investigates how Percy Shelley, Lord Byron and their circle understood the 
idea of “Europe.”  What geographical, political and ideological concepts did they 
associate with the term?   Which locations, historical episodes and opposing “others” 
did they use to formulate those understandings?  Through new readings of important 
texts--notably Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, A Defence of Poetry and Hellas--I analyze 
how Shelley and Byron construct ideas about Europe’s culture, history, geography 
and future.  In addition, the book gives sustained attention to under-read material, 
especially Percy Shelley’s Laon and Cythna and Byron’s The Age of Bronze, arguing 
that they are central to an understanding of the poets’ work and thought.  Shelley’s 
and Byron’s interest in Europe, I suggest, is part of an ongoing contemporary debate 
prompted by the political reshaping of the continent following the French Revolution 
and the Napoleonic Wars.  By discussing the circle’s writings in terms of 
contemporaneous materials (including political commentaries, travel writings, 
newspapers, treaties and diplomatic correspondence), I show how this wider context 
illuminates, and is illuminated by, the poets’ ideas of Europe.    
On one level therefore, this book provides fresh perspectives on Shelley’s and 
Byron’s writing and politics, particularly concerning their views on revolution, the 
classical tradition, the Greek War of Independence and European diplomacy.  But the 
implications for Romantic studies go further still.  As I outline below, scholars have 
recently invoked “cosmopolitanism” as a means to interpret Romantic writing outside 
its traditional relationship with nationalism.  But there is a problem with this 
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approach:  cosmopolitanism is an imprecise term, which, in its concern to transcend 
national loyalties, can too often ignore local contexts and steer perilously close to 
universalism.  And although it presents itself as an idea “without limits,” 
unconstrained by parochial restrictions, cosmopolitanism nevertheless depends upon 
very particular advantages:  wide travel, advanced education and mastery of many 
languages.  For this reason, a new approach is needed which sees Romanticism 
outside both the limits of nationalism and the problematic connotations of 
cosmopolitanism or “world citizenship.”  That approach can be found, this book 
argues, in a study of the idea of Europe, since an investigation of that concept engages 
with transnationalism as well as the specificities of particular locations and cultures.  
As I will show, “Europe” is a term rich with analytic possibilities:  it can evoke 
totalizing narratives of common history or identity and also express a range of 
competing political and ideological systems.  By focusing on ideas of Europe and 
tapping into this complexity, I show how the Shelley-Byron circle is interested in 
particular locations and local identities as well as transnational ideas about politics, 
history and culture.  This book therefore sets out an approach--both to Shelley’s and 
Byron’s work and the Romantic period more generally--which can account equally for 
the local, the national and the transnational rather than privileging one perspective 
over the others.  A focus on nationalist ideology in the period risks marginalizing 
important transnational concerns, especially regarding revolution, cultural encounter 
and the transmission of political and cultural ideas across borders.  On the other hand, 
an over-emphasis on “cosmopolitanism” ignores the localism and sense of specific 
place that remains central to much Romantic writing.  This book therefore explores 
the sometimes uneasy co-existence of local, national, transnational and even 
universalist perspectives, both within the works of individual writers and the debates 
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of their contemporary society.  Acknowledging this interaction (and its consequent 
problems), leads to a more sophisticated understanding of identity and politics in the 
Romantic period. 
 
The Idea of Europe 
What does it mean to talk of Europe as an idea?  In brief, I am interested in Europe as 
an ideological and cultural concept which is both “invented and experienced.”  
“Europe”, I want to suggest, cannot be defined definitively; instead it signifies “a 
series of world-views, […] of perspectives on reality, sometimes only dreamt or 
desired, sometimes experienced and realized.”1  Furthermore, it is partly “an 
ideological program which can be mobilized and invoked” for specific purposes; 
rather than asking “what is Europe,” says Mikael af Malmberg, we should instead 
examine how various ideas of Europe are used for political and cultural ends:  “how 
does Europe work as a practical category, as a classificatory scheme, as a cognitive 
frame?”2  In this respect, Europe is continuously re-imagined in order to give 
particular meanings and order to the past and the future.3  Significantly, it is also a 
component in further constructions; it shapes perspectives on the world and acts as a 
“cognitive frame” for further interpretations of politics, cultures and so on.  Ideas of 
Europe are thus both products and producers of complex interpretative processes.4  
With this in mind, my book examines how ideas about Europe were constructed in the 
early nineteenth century, and how those ideas were subsequently used in ideological 
and political terms. 
It would be misleading, however, to understand Europe simply as a 
“historically fabricated” invention.5  Europe, necessarily, is more than just an “idea” 
since it also consists of concrete applications:  it is built upon (perceptions of) actual 
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reality and therefore affects understanding of the material world and its politics.6  
Europe is not merely a “symbolic operation learned and communicated among human 
beings”; it is also a “reality of the material world and its human transformations by 
techniques and organization.”7  This relationship is symbiotic:  figurative ideas of 
Europe stem from (interpretations of) actual historical events or geographical 
observations, and those ideas, in turn, reconstruct perceptions of Europe’s “reality.”  
In this respect, Europe exists on the porous boundaries between the real and the 
imagined, between the “material world” and its symbolic representations. 
 
The Romantic Period:  Europe and Nationalism 
How have Romantic period studies imagined Europe thus far?  Traditionally, the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries have been associated with emerging ideas of 
nationalism, which Stuart Woolf defines as the “identification of a people with the 
territorial nation state.”8  Histories of nationalism typically argue that the partition of 
Poland, the American and French Revolutions, and the local reactions to Napoleon’s 
conquests inspired a “blueprint for a political program of national autonomy, unity 
and identity.”9  This configures Europe as a place where hostile states are in perpetual 
competition and where peoples and communities increasingly define themselves by 
their distinctive “nationality.”  Following this pattern, historians have attempted to 
show how British national identity emerged in the eighteenth century.  Linda Colley 
suggests that the fifty years after 1776 were “one of the most formative periods […] in 
the forging of British identity,” principally because prolonged conflict with France 
helped to shape a “particular sense of nationhood.”10  Similarly, for Gerald Newman, 
the theoretical components of nationalism--awareness of common language, war 
against a (French) other, hostility to Francophile upper-class culture, new secular 
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ideas of progress--combined to form a “consuming fire of nationalist demands and 
actions” as early as the 1740s.11 
Faced with this familiar interpretation, many literary critics associate the 
writing of the period with the development and consolidation of the nation state.  The 
tellingly-titled Romanticism in National Context argues that “the Romantics looked 
within their own nations, seeking to put down new roots in history, in folklore and 
folksong, in pure, indigenous traditions of language, speech and expression, in bards 
and ballads.”12  In this sense therefore, ideas about literary tradition and national 
history are mutually constitutive:  some critics have suggested, for instance, that 
Walter Scott’s and William Wordsworth’s writings assert a nationalist purpose by 
“emphasizing the connection of a people to its land” and by connecting “nineteenth-
century readers to the national past that defines them.”13  This also has implications 
for how British writing engages with “foreign” influences and peoples.  Although the 
post-Revolutionary period witnessed the migration of ideas and literatures “across 
social, cultural, national borders,” Peter Mortensen characterizes this interconnection 
as a “phobic” relationship:  the 1790s saw a rise in so-called “Europhobic” discourse, 
or a fear of “alien” influences in British literature and politics.14  This association of 
the Romantic period with nationalism has two important consequences.  Firstly, it 
constructs Europe as a foreign space distinct and detached from Britain.  As I will 
demonstrate, this is not necessarily a pervasive view:  many of the individuals I 
discuss, regardless of political persuasion, see Britain as being inseparably connected 
to a shared European culture, history and politics.  Secondly, this emphasis on 
nationalism interprets Europe as a patchwork of hostile states, divided by 
impenetrable cultural and political borders.  Again, this is only one of many 
competing perspectives:  ideas about rivalry and competition exist alongside 
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assumptions of mutual interest, common cultural foundations and even dreams of past 
and future unanimity.  In order to appreciate the full complexity of ideas about Europe 
in the Romantic period, it is therefore necessary to challenge and moderate any over-
emphasis on nationalism.       
 
Beyond the Nation 
How, though, is it possible to configure the period outside the terminology of 
nationalism?  Recent theorists have investigated how texts, identities and communities 
refuse to be confined by national boundaries.  After all, nationalism can only be 
understood in the context of “internationality,” since it constructs itself on the 
difference of “others” and on the interaction of purportedly discrete spaces and 
communities.15  For this reason, nationalism must necessarily co-exist with 
“transnationalism,” a term which, according to Stephen Vertovec, “broadly refers to 
multiple ties and interactions linking people and institutions across the borders of 
nation states.”16  
A number of scholars have adopted a “transnational” approach by analyzing 
cultural encounters and texts outside the framework of nationalism.  In Mary Louise 
Pratt’s terminology, these studies often talk about “contact zones”, or “social spaces 
where disparate cultures meet, clash,” and mutually influence one another.  Such 
“transcultural” interplay challenges the straightforward construction of nationhood in 
direct opposition to an enemy.17  Texts too can be understood in terms of transcultural 
circulation:  literary works often travel beyond their culture of origin, either in 
translation or in their original language.  Rather than being inseparably wedded to a 
particular nation or locality, they circulate in new contexts, both “locally inflected and 
translocally mobile.”18  Understanding these exchanges can therefore reconfigure 
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texts and identity politics outside the language of nationality without problematically 
dissolving the notions of community and people in a “postnational” abstraction.19  
Importantly for my purposes, these perspectives also allow early nineteenth-century 
Europe to be understood outside the dominant ideologies of nation-building. 
Indeed, some historians have re-conceptualized the period by looking beyond 
the standard emphasis on the rise of popular nationalisms and the nation state.  
Instead, Napoleonic rule imposed a measure of administrative and cultural uniformity 
across the continent, while the growth of empires caused transnational governmental 
procedures to be “exported to the rest of the world.”20  Felicity Nussbaum’s 
dissatisfaction with the restrictive “boundaries of national histories and literatures” 
have led her to focus on “worldwide crossings” of people, goods and ideas in order to 
show the interaction of “the local, the regional and the global” in eighteenth-century 
cultural and commercial encounters.  Significantly, this critique of nationalism opens 
analytical space for the local as well as the transnational, since it explores how “the 
regional, national, transnational and global are mutually implicated” rather than one 
obscuring or dominating the others.21 
Several recent studies have examined these “worldwide crossings” in 
Romantic literary culture, arguing that the period was characterized by “commerce 
des lumières (exchange of enlightened ideas),” “transnational dialogue” and “new 
forms of cosmopolitan identities and politics.”22  Margaret Cohen and Carolyn Dever, 
for example, suggest that the early nineteenth-century novel developed not through 
“nationally distinct trajectories” but through “intersections and interactions among 
texts, readers, writers and publishing and critical institutions that linked together 
Britain and France.”23  Central to this is the idea of “sentimental communities” of 
readers:  the international popularity of works by Goethe, Staël and Rousseau created 
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“transnational communities” linked by a shared emotional sympathy that “transcends 
nations, classes, and patriarchal families.”24  Karen O’Brien argues that eighteenth-
century historians--Voltaire, William Robertson, Edward Gibbon--wrote 
“cosmopolitan histories” which explore “how national identities intersect with […] 
one another” in “a common European civilization.”25  Robertson, for example, 
discusses how the kingdoms of Europe, “formerly single and disjointed, became so 
thoroughly acquainted, and so intimately connected with each other, as to form one 
great political system.”26   
It might seem, therefore, that my interest in the idea of Europe is connected to 
this recent work on Romantic period “cosmopolitanism,” especially since I discuss 
ideas not necessarily grounded in nationalist ideology.  In fact, however, there are 
several problems with using cosmopolitanism as an interpretative framework.  The 
first regards the term “cosmopolitanism” itself.27  Generally used to posit some sort of 
opposition to local loyalties and nationalisms, it “has acquired so many nuances and 
meanings as to negate its role as a unifying ethic.”  Not only do the sheer range of 
those varieties (for example, Christian, bourgeois, feminist, or socialist 
cosmopolitanisms) invest the term with bewildering vagueness, but it also implies a 
“detached loyalty” to abstract concepts--for example, “the human”--which are 
“incapable […] of providing any kind of political purchase.”28  In brief, “the term 
cosmopolitanism is too imprecise and widely contested to serve as a useful register of 
interactions between homelands and others.”  For example, it might denote someone 
utterly without roots or affiliations and alienated from society, or a “citizen of the 
world,” equally “at home” in different cultures.29   
There are other problems too.  Thomas Schlereth defines cosmopolitanism as 
“an attitude of mind that attempts to transcend chauvinistic national loyalties or 
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parochial prejudices.”  However, this suggests that the cosmopolitan is somehow 
removed from contexts and that it steers dangerously close to “universalism,” an 
erasure of difference which posits “an ideal for all men at all times.”  Such pretension 
to universality is especially problematic because cosmopolitanism typically represents 
the “social aspiration of the elite intellectual class”:  it is associated with the 
sophistication and wide travel of the rich and intellectuals.30  This is a very 
considerable problem for those who would emphasize the unconventional or 
innovatory perspectives afforded by cosmopolitanism.  Some have even suggested 
that the social exclusivity of “cosmopolitan taste” makes it politically reactionary, 
although it should be remembered too that cosmopolitanism’s refusal to be confined 
by a political state means it is sometimes “at odds with the dominant culture and 
questions its hegemony.”31  Indeed, radical writers--including, as I will show, the 
Shelley-Byron circle--sometimes manage to be both anti-establishment and totalizing 
when they attack governments for suppressing supposedly universal, but often quite 
personal, political ideals.32 
Regardless of the complex political connotations, cosmopolitanism in the 
sense of wide travel, advanced education and mastery of many languages is 
necessarily a minority experience.  It might present itself as an idea unconstrained by 
local loyalties or parochial restrictions, but it nevertheless depends upon very 
particular circumstances.  Given that cosmopolitanism in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries is so dependent on educational and financial advantages, to what 
extent does it really permit the erasure of cultural barriers that it purports to 
accomplish? 
 
Europe:  Beyond Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism 
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This book builds upon studies of Romantic period cosmopolitanism by seeking to 
view the period and its literature outside the framework of nationalism.  However, I 
am not trying to identify and celebrate a “cosmopolitan Europe,” nor do I use 
“European” as a synonym for “cosmopolitan ideal.”  Instead, I am interested in the 
range of meanings Europe possesses in the period.  “Europe,” I will argue, is a term 
rich with analytic possibilities:  it is used to evoke totalizing narratives of common 
history or identity and to express and legitimize numerous political and ideological 
systems.  As Étienne Balibar says:   
The name of Europe […] has been connected to cosmopolitan projects, 
to claims of imperial hegemony […] to the resistance that they 
provoked, to programs dividing up the world and expanding 
‘civilization’ […], to the rivalry of ‘blocs’ that disputed legitimate 
possession of it, to the creation of a ‘zone of prosperity’ north of the 
Mediterranean.33   
My purpose is to analyze the different interpretations and implications of “Europe” in 
the Shelley-Byron circle and, more widely, in early nineteenth-century Britain.  By 
studying these various representations, I approach the period and its writing beyond 
the restrictive boundaries of nationalism, without falling into the vague and 
problematic connotations of cosmopolitanism or “world citizenship.”   
In this sense, therefore, I am following recent work which, by reconsidering 
ideas about cosmopolitanism and nationalism, seeks new ways to understand the 
politics of identity and community.  Bruce Robbins redefines cosmopolitanism as “an 
impulse […] to transcend partiality that is itself partial”:  it looks beyond local 
specificity and is also a product of it.  In this respect, it is a methodological median 
between “false universalism” (which purports to erase or ignore local differences and 
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boundaries) and a restrictive preoccupation with those parochial divisions.34  
Nussbaum hopes for something similar when she calls for eighteenth-century “global 
studies,” which both “questions the boundaries of national histories” and avoids a 
homogenizing and universalist perspective.35  My contention here is that a nuanced 
study of the idea of Europe can effect this possibility, principally because it has to 
acknowledge how locally-grounded and transnational ideas interact to construct 
concepts and interpretations of Europe.   
Furthermore, it may well be unhistorical to speak of a binary distinction 
between nationalism and cosmopolitanism.  In this case, new approaches are needed 
to conceptualize the period’s identity and community politics more fully.  As several 
historians have observed, eighteenth and nineteenth-century intellectuals and 
revolutionaries often sought to represent their ideals and assumptions as 
simultaneously national, European and universal:  “by representing French culture as 
the leading edge of civilization, [French thinkers] identified the cause of humanity 
with their own national causes and saw themselves at the same time as French patriots 
and upstanding citizens of a cosmopolitan Republic of Letters.”36  For this reason, my 
analysis of ideas about Europe acknowledges the imbrication, rather than the 
incompatibility, of nationalist and transnational perspectives. 
I am seeking, therefore, to complicate the concepts of nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism, and to understand the period in terms of the interactions and 
frictions between localism and universalism.  Noting that “neither cosmopolitanism 
nor localism/nationalism are possible as pure positions,” David Simpson asks whether 
models can be found to negotiate these perspectives without succumbing absolutely to 
either of them.37  What I am suggesting is that an investigation into the meanings of 
Europe assists this project, moving understandings of (Romantic) identity politics in 
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new directions and encompassing the full richness of the period’s (trans)nationalism.  
Of course, this is not to imply that a European viewpoint is entirely unproblematic.  
As I will show, it can privilege local specificity--the supposed perfection of classical 
Greece, for example--just as it can construct Eurocentric universalisms.  But since it 
can encompass both these perspectives, analysis of the idea of Europe can do full 
justice to conceptions of identity and society in the period.  
 
The Idea of Europe and the Historical Moment 
Why, though, am I focusing on the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries?  
Many historians associate this period with significant developments in the history of 
the idea of Europe, particularly a decline in the notion of “Christendom” and its 
gradual replacement with secular understandings of collective European identity--for 
instance, shared “arts and inventions” or military superiority.38  In this way, Europe 
came to be understood as a system of states held together by civil sovereignty, 
commerce and diplomatic mechanisms designed to prevent religious wars and the 
growth of a hegemonic power.39  Montesquieu, for example, defined Europe in terms 
of “laws, morality, aristocracy, monarchy and liberty,” treating it not just as 
geographical term, but also a “cultural, political and intellectual entity with its own 
history and its own distinctive features.”40  Enrique Dussel also traces to the 
eighteenth century the influential idea that Europe has its intellectual and cultural 
origins in ancient Greece:  an ideological construct which ignores how Greek texts 
were mediated through Muslim civilizations and insists that Greek culture is 
“exclusively western and European.”41 
Furthermore, the tumultuous events following 1789 prompted prolonged 
competition over the political and ideological shape of Europe.  How should it be 
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organized?  What intellectual frameworks should justify or modify that structure?  
The Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars can thus be seen partly as a struggle between 
competing ideas of Europe:  should it be a homogenously ruled empire, a network of 
rival regions, or an “association of nations”?42  Other problems, which now seem very 
contemporary, also emerged or became more intense at this time:  difficulties of 
European nationalisms and conflict; questions about the geographical limits of 
Europe; the necessity of maintaining a “balance of power”; overtly imperial relations 
between Europe and the rest of the world.  These enquiries became fused with earlier 
ideas about Europe as “a civilization superior to all others” and as a “commercially 
integrated community,” creating new and influential tensions in nineteenth-century 
constructions of Europe.43   
As this implies, relations with the non-European world were especially crucial.  
Woolf argues that, through comparison with the extra-European world, “a distinctive 
conviction was forged of what constituted the essence of Europe’s superiority”, 
namely “role of the rational state” in furthering “civilization and progress.” This, in 
turn, “justified the material exploitation” of the rest of the world.  The emergence of 
new disciplines--anatomy, anthropology and philology--allowed Europeans to 
construct themselves and their “others” upon purportedly scientific foundations and 
according to renewed conviction of a unique “civilizing mission.”44  This is not an 
entirely uncontroversial view:  recent scholarship has suggested that, in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, “there seems to arise a new desire […] to construct an idea 
of Europe as ‘complete knowledge of itself’”; that is, to assume that Europe can be 
understood without reference to the rest of the world.  Instead of identifying an 
inferior other outside Europe, Montesquieu, Staël and others transferred its function 
onto a “negative part, or moment, of the European self”--most usually the Italian or 
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Iberian south.  By this means, they translate the ancient “discussion between freedom 
(Europe) and despotism (Asia)” “into a modern latitudinal rhetoric of north and 
south.”  These eighteenth-century ideas--of an industrious north and a backward 
south--still inform modern “expectations of what we take Europe to be.”45 
Of course, one could criticize these perspectives for oversimplifying or 
misrepresenting the (pre) Revolutionary period as an exclusive “point of origin” for 
certain ideas of Europe.  However, the wider point can be accepted without 
reservation:  the Romantic period, with its prolonged military and ideological 
conflicts, oversaw profound debate about Europe’s history and potential future.  This 
book sets out to uncover how those ideas of Europe were constructed, both by the 
Shelley-Byron circle and in wider British culture of the early nineteenth century. 
However, my focus differs from the above examinations of Europe in two 
principal ways.  Firstly, these historians usually “narrate” Europe, tracing changes in 
the concept over long periods of time.  They talk, for example, about the increasing 
importance of secularism, or the establishment of a modern “rational state.”  Writing a 
smooth trajectory of this kind is not my purpose here.  Instead, I aim to show how 
ideas of Europe contain several contradictory narratives which run concurrently and 
are in debate.  Secondly, while historians of the idea of Europe often focus on broad 
strands of time and sources, my study is of a much more specific group of individuals:  
the Shelley-Byron circle.  As Peter Burke has argued, investigating the use of the 
word “Europe” is all very well, but we need to be sure whose idea is under discussion 
and under what contexts and constraints those thoughts operate.  By identifying “the 
‘repertoire’ of concepts available for expressing group identity in different places and 
times,” we can edge towards a “social history of consciousness of Europe.”46   
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Percy Shelley and Byron are especially suited to such an investigation, not 
only because they experienced and were fascinated by the socio-political events of the 
period which saw Europe re-defined, but also because their works, as I will explore in 
detail, engage with many different ways to approach and understand Europe.  They 
write about travel across borders (both within and outside European space); they 
discuss political change and the prospects of a new future for Europe; they show 
(problematic) interest in non-European cultures; and they identify ancient Greece and 
Rome as the “foundations” of European culture.  Of course, focusing on particular 
individuals brings its own difficulties--their radicalism, relative wealth and 
(classically-based) education undoubtedly affects their conceptualization of Europe.  
They understand Graeco-Roman civilization, for example, not just in terms of its 
antiquarian interest, but as a living tradition which frames and inspires an 
understanding of Europe’s shared present and future as well as its common past.  
Furthermore, their perspectives are shaped by a British radical interpretation of 
“liberty” as freedom from religion, censorship and political “despotism.” My purpose 
is not, therefore, to operate under the illusion that Shelley and Byron are 
straightforward representatives of all British ideas of Europe.  Instead I want to show, 
firstly, how their specific reflections contribute to wider understandings of the history 
of the idea of Europe and, secondly, how a study of “Europe” can inform readings of 
their work, allowing us to see it outside the frameworks of nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism. 
Throughout the following chapters I read Percy Shelley’s and Byron’s works 
alongside the writings of their “circle,” a term I use broadly to refer to those people 
they traveled, corresponded or met with in a defined period of their careers.  In this 
respect, I contribute to recent work in Romantic studies which examines authors and 
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texts in terms of sociability and community.47  In general terms, I show how the circle 
discussed topics of mutual interest and how works were composed as part of group 
dialogues about, say, Napoleon’s downfall, the Greek War of Independence, or the 
prospect of radical revolution.  But I also highlight more specific interconnections:  
the significance of Hobhouse as an author who shared many of Byron’s intellectual 
interests in politics and travel writing; Percy Shelley’s suggestion that Byron write a 
poem on the French Revolution, a proposal which eventually inspired his own Laon 
and Cythna; Byron’s engagement with political debates about international relations 
in the 1820s, and his association, through Thomas Moore and Hobhouse, with radical 
and Whig politicians and ideas.  By showing how these individuals are part of 
interwoven group conversations and how the circle interacts with wider cultural 
discourses, I hope to avoid both an isolating focus on discrete individuals and the 
totalizations which would come from generalizing too broadly about ideas of Europe 
in the period.   
 
Structure and Argument 
Each chapter in this book deals with a specific moment in the careers of Byron or 
Percy Shelley, tracing their use and interpretations of Europe at that exact time.   
In his analysis of how texts both document and “critically construct” history, James 
Chandler explains how “case studies” are used to comprehend and interpret specific 
events according to the concerns of later commentators.  Historical understanding is 
thus constructed by a “dialogue” between two specific moments.  Clearly, my book 
can itself be seen in these terms, since it examines historical ideas of Europe in terms 
of recent developments in Romantic period studies and burgeoning interest in the 
meanings of Europe.  However, the Shelley-Byron circle also engages in this process, 
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constructing ideas of Europe through a dialogue between the ideological concerns of 
their present (for example, radical politics) and interpretations of ancient and recent 
historical events or “cases,” such as Waterloo or Greek-Persian conflict.  Moreover, 
case studies strive to identify both a unique instant and the wider schemes or 
structures for comprehending concepts at that moment.48  In this way, the Shelley-
Byron circle’s writings reveal certain cultural structures and patterns for 
understanding Europe in the nineteenth century, but they are also partly anomalous, 
imparting unique viewpoints that, for specific reasons (for example, their political 
perspectives or aristocratic backgrounds), cannot be seen as entirely “representative” 
of those general structures. 
Part one of this book introduces the key ways in which the Shelley-Byron 
circle construct ideas about Europe, focusing on Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage and 
other contemporaneous travel writings.  The circle’s real and imagined journeys 
through European spaces prompt reflections on borders, local particularity and 
national rivalry.  However, those same journeys also posit a transnational politics and 
culture, based on classical inheritance and the shared political implications of the 
Napoleonic wars.  Chapter one focuses on Byron’s trip to the Near East in 1809-11.  It 
examines his depiction of borders within and between European states, before 
considering how these boundaries construct ideas of Europe and its “others.”  The 
chapter also introduces the problem of Greece and its supposed legacy, considered 
central to the development of European civilization, but problematically located 
within the Ottoman Empire.  Chapter two investigates how Byron, Percy Shelley and 
their circle respond to the post-Waterloo political situation in 1815-16.   In the face of 
competing political programs for reorganizing the continent, they acknowledge a new 
multiplicity surrounding ideas of Europe.  At the same time, however, they also 
 18 
articulate a singular history which narrates Europe’s development according to a 
specific ideological agenda determined mainly by their radical suspicion of 
reactionary politics.  Furthermore, they understand Europe in terms of “freedom” and 
“liberty,” concepts which simultaneously evoke and challenge the potential for 
European unity.  Chapter three focuses on Byron’s residence in Italy between 1817 
and 1818.  Byron uses specific places in the Italian states to frame discussions of 
European history:  he describes the uniqueness of certain locations, especially Rome 
and Venice, but also uses them to construct a federal idea of Italian culture and 
history.  Italy, in turn, becomes a symbol for understanding modern Europe, 
particularly the ongoing struggles of monarchy and “freedom,” and the spread of a 
shared religion and classical heritage.   
Part two builds upon the ideas about Europe elucidated in the first three 
chapters, especially regarding international politics, the classical world and 
experiences of travel.  Percy Shelley uses these concepts about Europe for political 
ends:  to articulate his interests in radical reform, and to generalize his interpretation 
of European culture into an ideal model for universal progress.  Chapter four shows 
how, for the Shelley circle in 1817-18, ideas of Europe emerge from reflections on the 
French Revolution and its legacy.  I also consider how the circle identifies border-
zones between Europe and Asia (especially in Constantinople) and how America is 
both an “other” and a more perfect version of Europe.  The chapter concludes by 
discussing how the Shelleys were attacked for being “uneuropean” because they held 
allegedly defective (sexual) mores.  In chapter five, I turn to the texts in which Percy 
Shelley uses the word “Europe” most often:  the Defence of Poetry and Hellas, both 
written in 1821.  He writes about Europe in ways that are both totalizing and specific; 
in other words, he builds ideas of Europe on specific historical moments, but also 
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universalizes European civilization into an ideal for all places and periods.  The 
chapter continues by considering the circle’s concurrent interests in travel, translation 
and the (im)possibilities of transcultural communication.   
Part three explores the Byron circle’s engagements with actual political 
attempts to reshape Europe in the post-revolutionary period:  the “congress system” 
and the Greek War of Independence.  I discuss how Byron and other activists and 
politicians use discourses about Greece, revolution and (trans)nationalism to both 
advocate and critique practical models for Europe’s future.  Chapter six analyses the 
Byron circle’s reactions to international diplomacy in 1822-23.  While Byron and 
associates denounce oligarchical tyranny, the politicians responsible for the congress 
system use the language of peace and cooperation to construct very different ideas of 
Europe.  Crucially however, as in chapter two, the word “liberty” is used to articulate 
and justify very different interpretations of Europe’s history and future.  Lastly, 
chapter seven deals with Byron’s final trip to Greece in 1823-24.  Greece and Europe 
come to be seen as inseparable concepts:  support for the Greek War of Independence 
is intimately linked to enduring preoccupations with European cultural heritage and 
the possibility of radical change.  Problematically though, differing interpretations of 
the War expose ideological conflict about the idea of Europe, the nature of “liberty” 
and the purposes of that radical cause. 
These chapters therefore analyze a range of interweaving and competing 
concepts, which are particular to the circle itself, but also contribute to much wider 
debates about the future of Europe and the interpretation of its histories.  In the face of 
this complexity, it might be tempting to conclude that Europe is “a mass of values” 
which “have simply accumulated without being ordered to form a harmonious 
synthesis.”49  But just because a complete “synthesis” is impossible, this does not 
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mean that identifiable positions and trends cannot be recognized and analyzed.  Percy 
Shelley, Byron and their circle construct Europe using radical interpretations of 
“liberty” and “freedom”; they understand Europe through particular imaginings of 
ancient and modern Greek and Roman history; they define European spaces and 
cultures against Islamic and American others.  As part of these processes, they 
identify both a flawed and aberrant Europe (of depots and restorations) and an 
alternative European future, mediated through their interests in radical politics and the 
prospect of revolution (or at least a process of reform).  These Europes are entwined 
together, both conflicting with and conceptually dependent on one another.  Most 
importantly, the Shelley-Byron circle uses the language of “Europe” in a 
particularizing and a universalizing manner.  They identify specific historical events, 
places and writings which construct a uniquely European culture, whilst also 
generalizing that culture into a universal ideal for all humanity, a process which 
purports to disguise Europe’s particularity.   
By exploring these ideas, this book reconsiders the circle’s ideas and politics, 
noting how its members engage with and use contemporary events for ideological 
purposes.  Significantly though, Europe is both a discourse centered on political 
“debate and conflict” and has the “proportions of an unattainable idea.”50  In other 
words, ideas of Europe are political programs and not just immaterial “ideas”; yet, at 
the same time, they have a utopian dimension, since they look for a social prospect 
beyond immediate material conditions.  The language of Europe is a way to engage 
with (the frustrations of) political circumstances and to “go beyond” those restrictions 
by appealing to something more ideal.  This tension is central, I think, to 
comprehending the politics of Percy Shelley, Byron and their circle.  And nor do the 
implications of my argument end there.  By showing how various texts engage with 
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ideas about Europe, I present an approach to the period outside the dominant language 
of nationalism and the potentially imprecise generalizations of cosmopolitanism.  
“Europe” evokes a vocabulary able to articulate both transnationalism and the 
specificities of particular locations and cultures.  For this reason, the study of the idea 
of Europe can enable new ways to understand the complexities of identity formation 
and the politics of community in the Romantic period and beyond.   
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